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Daniel P. O’Gorman 
Learned Hand and the Objective Theory of Contract 
Interpretation 
18 U.N.H. L. Rev. 63 (2019) 
A B S T R A C T .   When scholars discuss Judge Learned Hand’s approach to contract interpretation, 
they refer to him as a “great formalist commercial lawyer” who was a “pure objectivist” exhibiting 
a “crusader’s zeal” for the objective theory of contract.  He is identified as a leading advocate of 
the classical approach to contract interpretation, which dominated American law in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  But Hand’s reputation—built from three of his 
opinions—clashes with his reputation as a pre-Realist critic of formalism and as an intentionalist 
in statutory interpretation.  This Article explores just how far Hand applied a strict objective 
approach to contract interpretation and whether the three famous opinions responsible for his 
reputation portray a somewhat misleading—or at least incomplete—picture of Hand’s approach 
to contract interpretation.  This Article concludes that while Hand did seem to exhibit a zeal for 
the objective theory of contract, his approach to contract interpretation was more modern than 
one would expect from a so-called great commercial formalist lawyer with a crusader’s zeal for the 
objective theory. 
A U T H O R .   Associate Professor, Barry University School of Law. J.D., New York University, 1993; 
B.A., University of Central Florida, 1990.  The author is indebted to Dean Leticia M. Diaz for 
providing a research grant on behalf of Barry University School of Law, without which this 
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I NT R ODUC T I ON 
When scholars discuss Judge Learned Hand’s approach to contract 
interpretation, they refer to him as a “great formalist commercial lawyer”1 who was 
a “pure objectivist”2 exhibiting a “crusader’s zeal” for the objective theory of 
contract.3  He is identified, along with Associate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. 
and Professor Samuel Williston, as a leading advocate of the classical approach to 
contract interpretation, which dominated American law in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.4  
Hand’s reputation comes primarily from three of his opinions, two written 
early in his career when he was a trial judge and the third when he was an appellate 
 
1  Stewart Macaulay, Transcript of Panel Discussion—Transactional Economics: Victor Goldberg’s 
Framing Contract Law, 49 S. Tex. L. Rev. 469, 476 (2007). 
2  Kevin M. Teeven, A History of the Anglo-American Common Law of Contract 276 n. 
175 (Greenwood Press 1990). 
3  E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 Yale L.J. 939, 943 (1967). 
4  Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statutes Really “Legislative Bargains”: The Failure of the Contract Analogy 
in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 1145, 1157 (1998); see also Lawrence Kalevitch, Contract, Will, 
and Social Practice, 3 J. L. & Pol 379, 382 (1995) (referring to “the defeat of the consensualists and 
the estoppelists of the late nineteenth century at the hands of Holmes, Hand and Williston and 
their objective theory of contracts.”).  
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judge.  The first was Hotchkiss v. National City Bank of N.Y.5 in 1911, which included the 
following memorable passage, considered a classic statement of the objective theory 
of contract: 
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent 
of the parties.  A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain 
acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a known 
intent.  If, however, it were proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he used 
the words, intended something else than the usual meaning which the law imposes 
upon them, he would still be held, unless there were some mutual mistake, or something 
else of the sort.6 
The second was Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co., in 1917.7  Hand’s 
opinion included a passage reminiscent of his dictum in Hotchkiss: 
It is quite true that we commonly speak of a contract as a question of intent, and for 
most purposes it is a convenient paraphrase, accurate enough, but, strictly speaking, 
untrue.  It makes not the least difference whether a promisor actually intends that 
meaning which the law will impose upon his words.  The whole House of Bishops might 
satisfy us that he had intended something else, and it would make not a particle of 
difference in his obligation.  That obligation the law attaches to his act of using certain 
words, provided, of course, the actor be under no disability.  The scope of those words 
will, in the absence of some convention to the contrary, be settled, it is true, by what the 
law supposes men would generally mean when they used them; but the promisor’s 
conformity to type is not a factor in his obligation.  Hence it follows that no declaration 
of the promisor as to his meaning when he used the words is of the slightest relevancy, 
however formally competent it may be as an admission.  Indeed, if both parties severally 
 
5  Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d, Ernst v. Mechanics’ 
Metals Nat. Bank of City of N.Y., 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l City Bank v. Hotchkiss, 
231 U.S. 50 (1913). 
6  Id. at 293; see also G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 433, 440 
n.33 (1993) (referring to the dictum as “a classic expression of the objective view of 
contract”); Michael J. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Reliance on Illusory Promises, 44 Sw. L.J. 841, 
903 n.350 (1990) (referring to it as “the classic statement of [the objective theory’s] effect”); Wendell 
H. Holmes, The Freedom Not to Contract, 60 Tul. L. Rev. 751, 798 n.3 (1986) (referring to it as the 
“classic formulation of the objective theory of contract”).  In Williston’s 1920 contracts treatise, he 
cited Hand’s dictum for the proposition that “[i]n regard to both torts and contracts, the law, not 
the parties, fixes the requirements of a legal obligation.”  Samuel Williston, The Law of 
Contracts § 21, at 22 (1st ed. 1920).  He also quoted the passage in full as the “sound view” as to 
whether a misunderstanding between the parties will prevent the formation of a contract.  Id. § 
94, at 176.  In 1946, Judge Jerome N. Frank of the Second Circuit wrote a concurring opinion that 
included a lengthy and scathing attack on the objective theory of contract, and cited to Hotchkiss 
as an example a judicial pronouncement advocating for “complete ‘objectivity’ in contract.”  
Ricketts v. Pa. R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 762 & n.9 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., concurring). 
7  Eustis Mining Co v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co., 239 F. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). 
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declared that their meaning had been other than the natural meaning, and each 
declaration was similar, it would be irrelevant, saving some mutual agreement between 
them to that effect.  When the court came to assign the meaning to their words, it would 
disregard such declarations, because they related only to their state of mind when the 
contract was made, and that has nothing to do with their obligations.8  
The third was James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros. in 1933, in which Hand refused to 
infer from an offer a promise to keep the offer open, even though the promisor knew 
the promisee had to detrimentally rely on the offer to put itself in a position to 
accept the offer.9  Hand famously wrote that “in commercial transactions it does not 
in the end promote justice to seek strained interpretations in aid of those who do 
not protect themselves.”10  
But Hand’s reputation as a great commercial formalist lawyer with a crusader’s 
zeal for the objective theory of contract—stemming from these three opinions—
clashes with his reputation as a pre-Realist critic of formalism11 and as an 
intentionalist in statutory interpretation.12  This Article thus seeks to determine just 
how far Hand, in his court opinions, applied a strict objective approach to contract 
interpretation and whether the three famous opinions responsible for his 
reputation portray a somewhat misleading—or at least incomplete—picture of 
Hand’s approach to contract interpretation.  
Part I of this Article provides a brief biographical sketch of Hand, paying 
 
8  Id. at 984–85. 
9  James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933); see also Avery Katz, When Should an 
Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Contract Negotiations, 105 Yale L.J. 1249, 1261 
(referring to James Baird Co. as “one of Judge Hand's most celebrated opinions and a warhorse of 
the casebooks.”). 
10  James Baird Co., 64 F.2d at 346. 
11  See Thomas C. Grey, Judicial Review and Legal Pragmatism, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 473, 506 
(2003) (identifying Hand as a  pre-Realist critic of formalism); see also G. Edward White, The 
American Judicial Tradition: Profiles of Leading American Judges 267 (1988) (“In the early 
years of the [twentieth] century [Hand’s] insistence that judges were free, within limits, to be 
creative identified him with Holmes, Pound, Cardozo, and other critics of both mechanical 
jurisprudence and what Hand called the ‘dictionary school’ of literalist statutory interpretation.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
12  See Movsesian, supra note 4, at 1191 & n.101 (noting Hand’s approach to contract 
interpretation and then stating, “Interestingly, Hand took an intentionalist approach to statutory 
interpretation.”); Archibald Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 Harv. L. 
Rev. 370, 376 (1947) (“When Judge Hand went on the bench, the literalism demanded by 
conservative tradition was in ascendancy, and but few cases were not adjudged according to the 
words of the statute on the ground that they had a plain meaning not to be altered without judicial 
legislation.  This attitude Judge Hand unequivocally rejected.”). 
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particular attention to any influences his background might have had on his 
approach to contract interpretation.  Part II discusses formalism and the prevailing 
approach to contract interpretation in the early twentieth century when Hand was 
appointed to the federal bench.  Part III is a brief summary of Hand’s approach to 
the objective theory of contract interpretation, based on an analysis of his opinions.  
Part IV analyzes Hand’s most important opinions regarding contract 
interpretation, providing support for the summary in Part III.  Part V is a brief 
conclusion, explaining that Hand’s reputation as a great commercial formalist 
lawyer with a crusader’s zeal for the objective theory of contract is an overly 
simplistic view of his approach to contract interpretation. 
I .  B I OGR AP HI C AL  B AC K GR OUND 
Hand was born Billings Learned Hand in 1872 in Albany, New York.13  He 
attended Harvard University from 1889 to 1893, and as an undergraduate studied 
psychology under the future pragmatist William James, who taught Hand that there 
were no unchallengeable truths, only questions.14  James seems to have had a strong 
influence on Hand, as throughout Hand’s life he would have a philosophy of 
skepticism and suspicion of absolutes close to James’s.15 
In 1893, Hand entered Harvard Law School.16  While in law school, he studied 
contracts under Samuel Williston,17 who would become the greatest contracts 
scholar of his time and who is considered the architect of classical contract law.18  
Williston would also come to be considered the greatest law teacher of his time.19  
The Willistonian model of contract law was grounded on the centrality of written 
agreements entered into voluntarily, with courts playing a limited role in enforcing 
and interpreting those agreements20 and was based on the assumption that 
 
13  The Yale Biographical Dictionary of American Law 248 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009) 
[hereinafter Yale Biographical Dictionary]. 
14  Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand: The Man and the Judge 33, 36 (1994). 
15  Id. at 37 n.*; see also id. at 35 (“What struck the most responsive chord in Learned was James’s 
distrust of absolutes, his doubts about metaphysics, and his emphasis on the empirical . . . .”).  
16  Id. at 43. 
17  Id. at 47 & n.187; see also Samuel Williston, Life and Law: An Autobiography 314 (1941) 
(identifying Hand as Williston’s former pupil). 
18  Mark L. Movsesian, Rediscovering Williston, 62 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 207, 208 (2005). 
19  See, e.g., Erwin N. Griswold, In Memoriam: Samuel Williston, 49 A.B.A. J. 362, 362 (1963) (noting 
that “Williston was, by common consent, the greatest law teacher of his time”). 
20  Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L.J. 
541, 549 (2003). 
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contracts often have a plain meaning.21  Williston also believed courts, when 
interpreting a contract, should not consider what the parties said to each other 
about the contract’s meaning or what the parties subjectively believed the contract 
meant.22  
Studying contract law under Williston, one might expect to find that the famed 
professor’s formalist approach to contract law, coupled with his considerable 
teaching abilities, exerted a strong intellectual influence on Hand.  But while Hand 
held legal scholars in high esteem,23 he did not succumb to hero worship and he 
perceived both his teachers’ strengths and weaknesses.24  For example, he was 
critical of Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell’s formalist approach to legal 
reasoning,25 and he preferred professors who combined the use of logic with 
wisdom and judgment.26  And Williston’s teaching style greatly emphasized using 
logic to reach the correct result.27  One commentator described Williston’s 
classroom exchanges as follows: “When he had finished with the beautiful structure 
of one of his platonic interchanges on the law of contracts, the student saw the 
inevitability of the result, as Williston had intended that he should.”28  
While Hand portrayed Williston “as an example of his own preferred model of 
tempering the search for logical constructs with breadth, sensitivity to reality, and 
humanity,”29 his other reflections suggest Williston was too rigid and theoretical for 
him.  He wrote: 
[H]e was so secure in his thinking, so prepared to encounter dissidence and gently 
dispose of it, that one wondered what was the perfect mechanism that his skull 
enclosed.  He seemed to be indifferent as to the effect of law, measured in human values, so long 
as it was consistent and clear.30 
 
21  Id. at 572; see also id. at 619 n.53 (“Willistonian formalism rest[ed] on two basic claims: (1) that 
contract terms can be interpreted according to their plain meanings, and (2) that written terms 
have priority over unwritten expressions of agreement.”). 
22  Joseph M. Perillo, Perillo on Contracts 132 (6th ed. 2009). 
23  Gunther, supra note 14, at 413. 
24  Id. at 47. 
25  Id. at 46. 
26  Id. at 47. 
27  Id. 
28  Arthur E. Sutherland, The Law at Harvard: A History of Ideas and Men, 1817–1967, at 
217 (1967). 
29  Gunther, supra note 14, at 48. 
30  Id. at 49 (quoting Letter from Learned Hand to A. James Casner, Nov. 10, 1959) (emphasis 
added). 
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He also wrote of Williston: “[H]is serene intelligence [was] unshaken by dissent.  In 
[the] classroom it were best not to cross swords with him, unless you were a master 
yourself, which no one was in my time.”31  Thus, unlike the tremendous influence 
Professor James Bradley Thayer had on Hand’s approach to judicial review as a 
result of a third-year constitutional law course,32 Hand’s reflections suggest 
Williston’s teaching did not have a notable impact on his future approach to 
contract law.  
In fact, perhaps more important to Hand’s future approach to contract law was 
Thayer.33  Thayer, for example, believed that the parol evidence rule was based on 
the idea that the parties intended prior agreements and negotiations to merge into 
the written contract and be superseded if not included,34 an important rationale for 
the rule that Hand followed as a judge, as will be discussed. 
Hand graduated from Harvard Law School in 1896,35 and his biographer 
summed up Hand’s law-school experience as follows: 
Hand drew important “legal lessons,” guidelines that would serve him well as lawyer 
and judge: a mix of conservatism and innovativeness, a loyal regard for legal traditions 
combined with an awareness that the legacy must be used “flexibly,” a recognition that 
the function of judges is confined but not uncreative, and a perception that “orderly 
change” is essential if civilization is not to perish “either by atrophy, or by convulsion.”36  
After Hand graduated from law school, he practiced law in Albany (and also 
dropped his first name).37  He, unfortunately, found his work there to be routine and 
unchallenging, and in 1902, he moved to New York City and started practicing at a 
Wall Street firm.38  But he found his work at the new firm to be mundane—
“administration of some old estates, insolvency claims, dull commercial 
 
31  Id. (quoting Learned Hand Memo for Williston, Harvard Law School Bulletin, January 1949, 
8). 
32  See Yale Biographical Dictionary, supra note 13, at 248 (“At Harvard Law School, class of 
1896, he heard James Bradley Thayer’s skepticism about judicial review, which made an indelible 
impression.”). 
33  Gunther, supra note 14, at 51 (noting that Hand first encountered Thayer in a second-year 
evidence course). 
34  James Bradley Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law 409 
(1898).  
35  Yale Biographical Dictionary, supra note 13, at 248. 
36  Gunther, supra note 14, at 52. 
37  Id. 
38  Id. at 101. 
T H E  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  N E W  H A M P S H I R E  L A W  R E V I E W  1 8 : 1  ( 2 0 1 9 )  
70 
matters”39—and in 1904 accepted a position at Gould & Wilkie, another Wall Street 
firm,40 where he became a partner.41  He did not, however, achieve much success as 
an attorney and was unhappy,42 ultimately considering his years as a lawyer to have 
been a failure.43  
Nothing about Hand’s years as a lawyer suggest they created in him any 
particular zeal to defend commercial interests.  During his years in practice he 
became more interested in politics than he had been (though he was by no means 
an activist), but rather than the political philosophy one would expect from a 
commercial formalist lawyer, he supported a mixture of socialism and laissez-
faire.44  He wrote that “‘in a vast multitude of cases the State must and 
should . . . modify the contractual relations which [individuals] assume toward one 
another.’”45  Thus, he did not believe in unbridled freedom of contract and, for 
example, considered it necessary for the government to regulate for the safety and 
health of women and children in factories.46  He opposed the concentration of 
economic power in large companies47 and supported curbing the abuses of 
economic power.48  
Far from being a zealot for freedom of contract, in 1908 Hand wrote an article 
published in the Harvard Law Review criticizing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision 
several years earlier in Lochner v. New York,49 in which the Court held 
unconstitutional on freedom of contract grounds a law limiting the hours of 
bakers.50  Hand believed that “no one can with justice apply to the concrete problems 
 
39  Id. at 102. 
40  Id. at 104. 
41  Id. 
42  Id. at 105–06. 
43  Id. at 107; see also White, supra note 11, at 261 (1988) (“He was not comfortable as a law 
practitioner, either in Albany, where he worked from 1896 to 1902, or in New York City, where he 
practiced until his 1909 appointment to the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York.”); Yale Biographical Dictionary, supra note 13, at 248 (noting that he had 
“middling” success practicing law in Albany and New York City). 
44  See Gunther, supra note 14, at 62. 
45  Id. (quoting Letter from Learned Hand to Augustus Hand (Nov. 6, 1898)). 
46  Id. at 62–63. 
47  Id. at 110. 
48  Id. at 114. 
49  Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 495 (1908). 
50  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 
(1937). 
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the yardstick of abstract economic theory,”51 and the only way in which the value of 
the law could be shown was by experiment, and the legislature was “the only public 
representative really fitted to experiment.”52  He wrote that “it is too late for the 
adherents of a strict laissez faire to condemn any law for the sole reason that it 
interferes with the freedom of contract.”53  Hand accused the justices of 
implementing their economic biases,54 and he showed support for the government 
interfering with freedom of contract to correct the abuses of unequal bargaining 
power, writing: 
For the state to intervene to make more just and equal the relative strategic advantages 
of the two parties to the contract, of whom one is under the pressure of absolute want, 
while the other is not, is as proper a legislative function as that it should neutralize the 
relative advantages arising from fraudulent cunning or from superior physical force.55  
Later, in 1921, in correspondence Hand and Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter 
agreed that the “damned Bill of Rights” had permitted judges to put their laissez 
faire economic biases into the Constitution.56 
Because of his unhappiness practicing law, Hand sought to obtain a federal 
judgeship.57  His first attempt came in 1907, but it was unsuccessful.58  His second 
attempt—in 1909—succeeded.59  His friends in New York admired his independent 
mind,60 which had been displayed in his article criticizing Lochner,61 and Hand was 
fortunate that the national administration wanted to nominate an independent 
intellectual.62  In New York, he had met the influential Charles C. Burlingham, a 
lawyer and reformer who advocated for better quality judges, and Burlingham 
recommended Hand to U.S. Attorney General George W. Wickersham for a 
judgeship.63  In 1909, President William Howard Taft appointed Hand to the federal 
 
51  Hand, supra note 49, at 507. 
52  Id. at 508. 
53  Id. at 502. 
54  Id. at 508. 
55  Id. at 506. 
56  Gunther, supra note 14, at 373. 
57  See id. at 106. 
58  Id.  
59  Id. at 107; Yale Biographical Dictionary, supra note 13, at 248. 
60  Gunther, supra note 14, at 107. 
61  Id. at 123. 
62  Id. at 107. 
63  Id. at 107–08. 
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trial court in the Southern District of New York.64  
Hand served as a federal trial judge for fifteen years,65 during which time he 
earned a reputation among other judges as a great jurist.66  New York’s economic 
and intellectual importance and Hand’s original and clear writing style helped gain 
him this reputation.67  As early as the 1920s, and before being appointed to the 
Second Circuit, Justice Holmes recommended his appointment to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.68  In 1925, Benjamin Nathan Cardozo (then a judge on the New York Court of 
Appeals) ranked Hand among the two or three judges he considered close to Holmes 
in his esteem,69 and in the same year Hand was introduced at the annual meeting of 
the Association of American Law Schools as “an idol of the bench.”70 
In 1922, Hand’s reputation was such that he was invited to join the Committee 
on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the Improvement of the 
Law, a committee with nearly forty members and “a virtual Who’s Who of leaders of 
the profession.”71  The committee founded the American Law Institute (ALI) in 1923, 
which sought “to help make certain much that is now uncertain and to simplify 
unnecessary complexities, but also to promote those changes which will tend better 
to adapt the laws to the needs of life.”72  Although the ALI’s original aim included 
“adapt[ing] the laws to the needs of life,” Hand supported the ALI’s self-imposed 
restraint of articulating the law “as it is,” rather than articulating the law as the ALI 
thought it should be.73  Hand believed that the ALI should “restate, not legislate,” his 
biographer noting that “just as he was opposed to unelected courts dictating public 
policy, so was he critical of a legal elite’s substituting its dictates for democratic 
choices on contentious issues.”74  
 
64  Id. at 132. 
65  White, supra note 11, at 253. 
66  Id. at 263.  But see Jerome M. Frank, Some Reflections on Judge Learned Hand, 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
666, 675 (1957) (stating with respect to Hand’s trial-court years, “[e]xcept for a few articles and 
some notable judicial opinions, he would have been known for his efforts in those years to few 
other than the New York Bar.”). 
67  White, supra note 11, at 264. 
68  Id. at 263. 
69  Id.  
70  Gunther, supra note 14, at 414. 
71  Id. at 410. 
72  American Law Institute, Report of the Committee 14 (1923). 
73  Gunther, supra note 14, at 412. 
74  Id. 
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Over the years, Hand was a faithful attendee at ALI meetings,75 but there is little 
evidence that the ALI’s work on the Restatement of Contracts,76 published in 1932, made 
an impact on Hand’s approach to contract interpretation.  Hand was not on the 
Committee on Contracts,77 and he rarely cited to the Restatements in his judicial 
opinions.78  His involvement with the ALI did show, however, that he desired greater 
clarity in the common law.  As noted by his biographer, he had a “concern with 
clarifying the legal framework [and] [d]uring most of his years on the bench, Hand 
confronted a body of law that ranged from useless generalizations to annoying 
technicalities.”79 
In 1924, shortly after joining the ALI, Hand was appointed to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the court on which he would sit until his 
death in 1961.80  He served as a federal judge for fifty-two years, writing about 3,000 
opinions.81  Although never appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Second 
Circuit provided Hand with an opportunity to hear important cases involving 
sizable sums of money argued by members of one of the country’s leading bars.82  
In 1929, not long after his appointment to the Second Circuit, Hand became a 
founding member of the National Advisory Committee of the Institute of Law at 
Johns Hopkins University, an organization dedicated to promoting empirical 
social-science research in the law.83  In a letter to the University’s president, Hand 
displayed an interest in studying the law in action, writing: “We are still largely 
living in adolescent dogmas, uncriticized, often emanating from purposes of which 
we are but dimly conscious. The Institute would at least make us aware of our 
assumptions; that is much.”84 
Hand’s approach to judging has been described as combining creativity and 
restraint,85 and seeking to “retain and revive the longstanding canon that judges 
 
75  Id. at 410–11. 
76  Id. at 413. 
77  See Restatement (First) of Contracts vi (Am. Law. Inst. 1932) (listing the committee 
members). 
78  Gunther, supra note 14, at 413. 
79  Id. at 313. 
80  Yale Biographical Dictionary, supra note 13, at 248; Gunther, supra note 14, at 679. 
81  Yale Biographical Dictionary, supra note 13, at 248. 
82  White, supra note 11, at 276. 
83  Gunther, supra note 14, at 408–09. 
84  Id. at 409. 
85  White, supra note 11, at 285. 
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were never truly free to decide in accordance with their personal views.”86  But at 
the same time, for him “[i]t was not enough to base a decision on outdated formulas 
and on legal clichés; throughout his career he sought to adapt the law to the rapid 
changes in society and industry.”87  Skeptical of absolute truths, the pragmatism he 
had learned from William James as an undergraduate student stuck with him—“the 
philosophy that ideas derive meaning from their practical consequences.”88  And it 
was this pragmatism that was perhaps his most memorable attribute and most 
significant contribution to judging.89  
During his judicial career, Hand rejected two extreme schools of 
jurisprudence—one was what he called the “dictionary school” that interpreted 
statutes literally and the other was the view that the judge should disregard the law 
(his view of Legal Realism).90  Hand took a middle path, believing that legal 
doctrines contained elements of myth and fiction and that subjectivity was an 
important element of judging, and involved an attempt to weigh unquantifiable 
values.91  With respect to statutory interpretation, he rejected the prevalent view in 
the late nineteenth century that courts should limit interpretation to the ordinary 
or plain meaning of a statute.92  Rather, he sought to find a middle ground between 
the dictionary school and Realism by focusing on the statute’s purpose.93 
Hand’s background and his general approach to judging thus suggests that, 
with respect to the law of contract interpretation, he would desire to clarify the rules 
of interpretation.  At the same time, Hand understood that general statements of 
law cannot always determine outcomes in particular cases.  Hand would reject the 
belief that the language used by the parties can have a plain meaning outside of the 
context in which it is used, and he would take account of the parties’ purpose in 
entering into the contract.  This Article will turn to Hand’s approach to contract 
interpretation after a brief survey of formalism and the law of contract 
interpretation at the turn of the twentieth century, inasmuch as Hand’s approach 
to contract interpretation is viewed as quintessentially formalistic. 
 
86  Id. at 291. 
87  Marvin Schick, Learned Hand’s Court 189 (1970). 
88  Yale Biographical Dictionary, supra note 13, at 249. 
89  James Oakes, Personal Reflections on Learned Hand and the Second Circuit, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 387, 
393 (1995). 
90  White, supra note 11, at 267–68. 
91  Id. at 275. 
92  Id. at 284. 
93  Id.; see also Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence 228 (1995) (“Learned 
Hand . . . had been advocating the purposive interpretation of law since the mid-1940s.”). 
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I I .  C ONT R AC T  I NT E R P R E T AT I ON AT  T HE  T UR N OF  T HE  T WE NT I E T H 
C E NT UR Y 
From the mid-nineteenth century through the First World War, the 
predominant mode of legal thinking was referred to as “formalism” or “mechanical 
jurisprudence,” now referred to as “classical legal thought.”94  Formalists believed 
that specific legal rules and court opinions could be traced to a few basic principles, 
which in turn could be linked to a few fundamental concepts, in particular the 
concept of respecting the will or autonomy of legal authorities, as well as private 
contracting parties.95  Classical legal thought was thus associated with the economic 
principle of laissez faire.96  This association of laissez faire and classical legal 
thought was reinforced by courts believing that the “right to property” and the “right 
to contract” were constitutionally protected by a person’s autonomy.97  Thus, 
scholars and judges supporting social legislation criticized the reasoning of judges 
using classical legal thought.98 
During this era, there also arose what is referred to as “classical contract law.”99  
Classical contract law is most commonly associated with Holmes and Williston, 
with Holmes providing the theory’s broad outlines in 1881 in his book The Common 
Law and Williston the details in 1920 in his treatise The Law of Contracts.100  Its high-
water mark is associated with the publication of the Restatement of Contracts in 1932, 
with Williston as its reporter.101  By that point, however, formalism had been under 
attack from the Legal Realists, and the publication of the Restatements is viewed by 
some as a life-support effort to save formalism,102 a “last long-drawn-out gasp of a 
 
94  David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III, Introduction to The Canon of American Legal 
Thought 8–9 (David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III, eds., 2006) [hereinafter Canon]. 
95  Id. at 9. 
96  Id. at 10. 
97  Id. 
98  Id. 
99  Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 678, 681 (1984). 
100  Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract 6 & n.4, 15 (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995); 
see also Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49 Hastings L.J. 1191, 
1193 (1998) (“Gilmore attributed the essential shape of classical contract law to three Harvard law 
professors: Langdell, Holmes and Williston.  By 1880, the first two members of triumvirate of 
classical architects were already busily sketching the outlines of what would become the generally 
accepted structure of American contract law.”). 
101  See Knapp, supra note 100, at 1193–94; see also Restatement (First) of Contracts, supra note 
77, at ix (identifying Williston as the Reporter).  
102  Gilmore, supra note 100, at 74. 
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dying tradition.”103  Professor Grant Gilmore believed that the Restatement of 
Contracts was itself schizophrenic, “poised between past and future.”104  This early 
twentieth century assault on classical contract law would be led by Professor Arthur 
L. Corbin of Yale Law School, starting with a series of articles in the early twentieth 
century.105 
Reminiscent of formalism, classical contract law was a general theory that 
applied to all types of contracts, rather than having separate theories for different 
types of contracts.106  This process of creating a general theory of contract law is 
traced to Christopher Columbus Langdell, Dean of Harvard Law School, and his 
1880 contracts casebook.107  It continued throughout the era of classical legal 
thought, with Holmes’s efforts in The Common Law, Williston’s treatise, and the 
Restatement of Contracts.  Holmes in the late nineteenth century sought not only to 
make sense of contract law, but of the common law as a whole.108  In Williston’s 
introduction to his 1920 treatise, he wrote that the law of contracts “tends from its 
very size to fall apart,” and asserted that “[i]t therefore seems desirable to treat the 
subject of contracts as a whole, and to show the wide range of application of its 
principles.”109  The ALI’s desire to restate the rules of the common law was designed 
to “clarify and simplify the law and to render it more certain . . . .”110  The ALI stated 
that “the vast and ever increasing volume of the decisions of the courts establishing 
new rules or precedents, and the numerous instances in which the decisions are 
irreconcilable has resulted in ever increasing uncertainty in the law.”111  Thus, 
classical contract law valued certainty.  
Consistent with a desire for certainty, classical contract law preferred bright-
 
103  Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 833 
(1935). 
104  Gilmore, supra note 100, at 71-72. 
105  See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960: The Crisis 
of Legal Orthodoxy 49 (1992) (identifying Corbin as challenging the will theory through “a 
series of monumentally influential articles on particular aspects of contract law between 1912 and 
1918 . . . .”). 
106  See Lawrence M. Friedman, Contract Law in America: A Social and Economic Case 
Study 20–24 (1965). 
107  Gilmore, supra note 100, at 13. 
108  See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (1881). 
109  Samuel Williston, 1 The Law of Contracts iii (1920). 
110  Restatement (First) of Contracts, supra note 77, intro. viii. 
111  Id. 
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line rules to vague standards,112 the former having the benefit of restraining official 
arbitrariness.113  This preference for rules over standards, and the desire for 
certainty, included preferring written documents to oral terms, and was manifested 
in doctrines such as the plain meaning rule and the parol evidence rule.114  
These bright-line rules were to be derived through deduction from abstract, 
axiomatic principles.115  And these principles were based on the idea of freedom of 
contract, the idea that individuals should have the power to enter into contracts and 
have the government enforce them without significant qualifications.116  They were 
also, however, based on the idea of freedom from contract, in the sense that parties 
should not have contractual obligations imposed upon them to which they had not 
assented.117 
While classical contract law might have been premised on the principle or 
policy of freedom of (and from) contract, adherents had different reasons for 
supporting it.  Some considered it based on the natural law theory of liberalism, and 
an inalienable right to own property and dispose of it as you wished, in the sense 
that freedom of contract (and freedom from contract) was a fundamental right 
based on the right to autonomy.118  This was known as the “will theory of contract.”119  
With respect to freedom of contract, it resembled a Kantian approach to being 
 
112  See Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71 Fordham 
L. Rev. 761, 767 (2002). 
113  Canon, supra note 94, at 633 (“It has been common ground, at least since Ihering, that the 
two great social virtues of formally realizable rules, as opposed to standards or principles, are the 
restraint of official arbitrariness and certainty.”). 
114  See Knapp, supra note 112, at 767. 
115  See id.; see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There is no Law of Relational Contracts, 94 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 805, 805 (2000) (“Classical contract law was axiomatic in nature.  Axiomatic theories of law 
take as a premise that fundamental doctrinal propositions can be established on the ground that 
they are self-evident.”). 
116  See Knapp, supra note 112, at 767. 
117  See Lucas S. Osborn, The Leaky Common Law: An “Offer to Sell” as a Policy Tool in Patent Law and 
Beyond, 53 Santa Clara L. Rev. 143, 147 (2013) (“[T]raditional contract law also seeks to ensure that 
individuals are free from having contractual obligations imposed on them unexpectedly. This 
freedom may be referred to as ‘freedom from contract’ . . . .”).  
118  See W. David Slawson, Binding Promises: The Late 20th-Century Reformation of 
Contract Law 10–11 (1996); P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract 8–13 
(1979) (discussing English judges). 
119  See Morris Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 553, 575 (1933) (discussing the will 
theory of contract).  
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morally responsible for your actions,120 and was premised on a move away from 
paternalism and toward individualism, the idea that people could be trusted to look 
out for themselves.121  Coupled with this was the notion that compelled sharing and 
sacrifice should be restricted (freedom from contract).122  This led to a system of 
contract law under which it was hard to form a contract, but once formed it was 
hard to avoid.123  
But classical contract law was also based on the policy of the free market,124 and 
based on the benefits of competition and the freedom of parties to set prices and 
other contract terms.125  Unlike the principle of autonomy, this was a utilitarian 
policy to increase social welfare.126  For example, Holmes in his 1897 article The Path 
of the Law openly accepted utilitarianism as law’s goal.127  
One of the features of classical contract law was the objective theory of 
contract,128 which “holds that the intentions of the parties to a contract or alleged 
contract are to be ascertained from their words and conduct rather than their 
unexpressed intentions.”129  Holmes was a particularly strong advocate of the 
objective theory of contract.130  He wrote in The Common Law that “the making of a 
contract does not depend on the state of the parties’ minds, it depends on their overt 
acts”131 and that “[t]he law has nothing to do with the actual state of the parties’ 
 
120  See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 961, 1104 n.322 
(2001) (equating the will theory with Kantianism). 
121  Atiyah, supra note 118, at 8–10. 
122  Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685, 1735 
(1976). 
123  Gilmore, supra note 100, at 52–53. 
124  Slawson, supra note 118, at 10. 
125  Id. 
126  See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1068 (1975) (“Economic efficiency is a 
collective goal: it calls for such distribution of opportunities and liabilities as will produce the 
greatest aggregate economic benefit defined in some way.”). 
127  William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to the Legal 
Process, in Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the 
Making and Application of Law lvii (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). 
128  Eisenberg, supra note 115, at 807. 
129  Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69 
Fordham L. Rev. 427, 427 (2000). 
130  See Sanford Schane, Ambiguity and Misunderstanding in the Law, 25 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 167, 
183 n.48 (2002) (noting that Holmes was “a staunch advocate of the objective theory of contracts.”). 
131  See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 307 (1881). 
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minds. In contract, as elsewhere, it must go by externals, and judge parties by their 
conduct.”132  In 1897, in his famous article The Path of the Law, Holmes wrote that “the 
making of a contract depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, 
but on the agreement of two sets of external signs—not on the parties having meant 
the same thing but on their having said the same thing.”133  
Scholars disagree on whether the objective theory arose in the late nineteenth 
century or whether it has older origins.  One view is that there was a shift in the late 
nineteenth century from a subjective theory to an objective theory based on the 
reasonable expectations of the promisee.134  The reason for the ascendency 
(according to this view) was that as transactions increasingly occurred between 
strangers, the need to rely on the other party’s external manifestations increased.135  
Support for this reason is based on contemporary writers such as Parsons, Langdell, 
Holmes, and Williston noting commerce’s need for predictability.136  
The other view, which was advocated by Professor Joseph M. Perillo, is that the 
objective theory of contract has predominated in the common law since time 
immemorial, with a “brief but almost inconsequential flirtation with subjective 
approaches in the mid-nineteenth century.”137  Perillo argued that this brief 
flirtation with a subjective approach came to an end—and the modern era of the 
objective theory ushered in—when courts started permitting parties to testify on 
their own behalf.138  The objective theory persisted—according to Perillo—because 
of the legal profession’s distrust of the testimony of parties, and the modern 
objective theory thus arose as a response to the relaxed rules of evidence permitting 
parties to testify.139 
While the two views might differ about whether the objective theory was 
present from time immemorial or was a product of the nineteenth century, there 
was no doubt that by the late nineteenth century the objective theory prevailed over 
a subjective theory.140  The objective theory of contract, however, was surely in some 
 
132  Id. at 309. 
133  O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 464 (1897).   
134  Kevin M. Teeven, A History of the Anglo-American Common Law of Contract 239 
(1990). 
135  Id. at 275 n.160. 
136  Id. at 239. 
137  Perillo, supra note 129, at 428. 
138  Id. at 428–29. 
139  Id. at 477. 
140  See  Lauren E. Miller, Breaking the Language Barrier: The Failure of the Objective Theory to Promote 
Fairness in Language-Barrier Contracting, 43 Ind. L. Rev. 175, 177 (2009) (“Since 
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tension with the will theory of contract, the latter focusing on autonomy and the 
former focusing on what a reasonable person would believe was intended.141 
I I I .  S UMMARY OF  HAND’ S  APPROACH T O T HE  OBJ E C T I V E  T HE OR Y  OF  
C ONT R AC T  I NT E R P R E T AT I ON 
An analysis of Hand’s contract opinions (discussed in detail in the next section) 
shows that Hand’s strain of objectivism was based on the belief that certainty is 
necessary in contractual relations, rather than the will theory of contract.  He aimed 
to increase certainty in contractual relations by excluding what parties said to each 
other during pre-contract negotiations leading to a written agreement, as well as 
post-hoc declarations or admissions about their intentions.  In this sense, he was in 
fact a strong advocate of the objective theory of contract, but he was not a formalist 
in the sense that he believed the rules of contract interpretation were derived from 
the axiomatic principle of autonomy and a right to freedom of (and from) contract.  
Rather, his support for the objective theory came from utilitarianism—a belief that 
predictability is necessary in contractual arrangements. 
While Hand shared classical contract law’s respect for the written contract, his 
approach was different from classical contract law in the sense that he rejected the 
idea that a contract’s provisions could have a plain meaning.  He would not consider 
evidence of what the parties said to each other during pre-contract negotiations and 
what the parties subjectively intended, and thus not all extrinsic evidence was fair 
game.  But he otherwise aimed to implement the parties’ intentions through 
consideration of any other relevant evidence, believing that the understanding of 
the parties should count rather than the understanding of others.142  While he 
believed that the words chosen “are always the most important evidence of the 
parties’ intention,”143 he also sought to determine their intentions through a 
consideration of all other relevant extrinsic evidence.  Thus, while he was a strong 
advocate of the objective theory of contract, in determining what a reasonable 
person would believe the parties intended he was willing to consider much evidence 
outside the written document.  
 
the late nineteenth century, courts have applied the objective theory to determine which 
manifestations amount to assent to form a contract.”).  
141  See Nicholas C. Dranias, Consideration as Contract: A Secular Natural Law of Contracts, 12 Tex. 
Rev. L. & Pol. 267, 296, 297 (2008) (“The theoretical justifications for the objective theory were 
largely pragmatic reactions to the purported problems of the will theory.”).  
142  See Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 601 (2d Cir. 1947) (“It is the 
understanding of such persons that counts”). 
143  Eddy v. Prudence Bonds Corp., 165 F.2d 157, 161 (2d Cir. 1947). 
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An analysis of Hand’s opinions discloses that he rejected the declarations by the 
parties about what they thought the contract meant because he believed it usurped 
the court’s (or jury’s) function in deciding what the parties’ understanding was and 
because unexpressed intent is irrelevant.  This former basis was consistent with 
Hand’s (and classical legal thought’s) general respect for separation of powers.  The 
latter basis flowed from his belief—consistent with the other leading advocates of 
the objective theory at the time—of the importance of parties being able to rely on 
the apparent terms of a contract.  Hand made it clear that excluding testimony 
about what the parties believed the contract meant was necessary to avoid 
uncertainty with respect to the interpretation of contracts.  Importantly, however, 
Hand did not reject that particular type of evidence because he believed what the 
parties intended was irrelevant; he simply believed that unexpressed intentions were 
irrelevant.  In fact, he maintained that if it appears from the parties’ words or acts 
that they attributed a peculiar meaning to a term, that meaning would prevail.  
With respect to what the parties expressed to each other during negotiations 
before reducing the agreement to writing, Hand rejected this evidence because he 
believed that when parties integrated their agreement, they intended the written 
document to exclude evidence of what the parties said during negotiations about 
its meaning.  Hand viewed this as an application of the parol evidence rule, stating 
that “[t]he parol evidence rule means only this: That where the parties have in any 
form said that a writing shall completely embody their engagements, the court can 
enforce none but the written stipulations without disregarding the very contract 
they have made.”144 
I V.  L E AR NE D HAND’ S  OP I NI ONS  ON C ON T R AC T  I N T E R P R E T AT I ON 
The discussion in this section is organized into four subsections.  The first 
section is an analysis of Hand’s opinion in Hotchkiss and his approach to 
unexpressed understandings.  The second section is an analysis of Hand’s opinion 
in Eustis Mining and his approach to post-hoc admissions and expressed but 
unincorporated intentions.  The third section is an analysis of the role of contextual 
evidence in Hand’s approach to contract interpretation, and his rejection of the 
belief that words can have a plain meaning outside of their context.  The fourth 
section is an analysis of Hand’s decision in James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., and 
his approach to inferring promises.  
 
144  In re Canfield, 190 F. 266, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), rev’d on other grounds, 193 F. 934 (2d Cir. 1912), aff’d 
sub nom. Houghton v. Burden, 228 U.S. 161 (1913). 
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A. Hotchkiss and Unexpressed Understandings 
A review of the Hotchkiss opinion in its entirety, rather than just its famous 
dictum, shows that Hand in that case was concerned with self-serving testimony by 
one of the parties about how the parties to the contract allegedly understood the 
terms.145  In Hotchkiss, the issue was whether a contract for clearance loans146 
between a bank and (now bankrupt) stockbrokers provided that securities 
purchased with the loans would be subject to a lien as collateral for the loans.147   
Hand’s famous dictum was in response to the testimony of a man named Carse, 
whose testimony for the bank went further than the actual practice of the 
stockbrokers and the bank (they had done business for many years), which Hand 
had already concluded did not support the finding of a lien.148  Carse testified as to 
what the stockbrokers and the bank understood the legal status of the securities to 
be, testifying as follows: 
It [the practice between the stockbrokers and the bank] has developed a form of trust, 
and the clear understanding implied between the broker and the bank is that whatever 
the broker obtains by the proceeds of the loan given to him is held in trust for the 
account of the bank. . . . If a broker pays for stocks or bonds, it is the understanding of 
the bank that they belong to them as collateral to their loan, and the broker simply 
retains possession of them long enough to make delivery and get payment . . . .149 
Hand stated that the testimony was not competent evidence because “it in 
effect usurps the court’s function which is to decide what was the ‘clear 
understanding.’”150  Hand, however, not wanting to imply that the parties’ actual 
understanding was relevant, even to the court, held that it was “of no consequence 
for another and deeper reason,” and explained: 
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent 
of the parties.  A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain 
acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a known 
intent.  If, however, it were proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he used 
the words, intended something else than the usual meaning which the law imposes 
upon them, he would still be held, unless there were some mutual mistake, or something 
 
145  See generally Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d, Ernst v. 
Mechanics’ Metals Nat. Bank of City of N.Y., 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l City Bank 
v. Hotchkiss, 231 U.S. 50 (1913). 
146  Clearance loans are loans for the day, enabling a stockbroker to buy stocks for his customers, 
repaid with the proceeds from the sale to the customer the following day.  See id. at 289. 
147  Id. at 289–90. 
148  Id. at 289, 293. 
149  Id. at 293. 
150  Id.  
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else of the sort.151  
While the phrase “usual meaning which the law imposes upon them” might lead one 
to believe Hand was referring to a provision’s “plain meaning,” such a belief is belied 
by Hand’s earlier analysis in the case.  Hand, though stating that he was proceeding 
on the “assum[ption] that the written contracts may be varied by proof of a custom,”152 
had considered extensively the parties’ practices in seeking to determine the 
contract’s meaning.153  This shows that he likely meant usual meaning based not 
only on the language used, but by also taking into account the deal’s context.  
Also, Hand’s famous dictum did not stop there, and he added the following 
qualification, which is often omitted when Hand’s dictum is quoted154: “[o]f course, 
if it appear by other words, or acts, of the parties, that they attribute a peculiar 
meaning to such words as they use in the contract, that meaning will prevail, but 
only by virtue of the other words, and not because of their unexpressed intent.”155  
Thus, “[w]hat must be rejected, according to Hand, is not the notion of intent, but 
rather, testimony based upon intent that was unexpressed [either verbally or 
through prior actions] at the time the contract is alleged to have been formed.”156 
But Hand also made clear that the parties’ subjective intentions of the meaning 
of their prior actions were irrelevant.  What was important was how the court 
believed a reasonable person would interpret those acts: 
Now, in the case at bar, whatever was the understanding in fact of the banks, and of the 
brokers, too, for that matter, of the legal effect of this practice between them, it is of not 
the slightest consequence, unless it took form in some acts or words, which, being reasonably 
interpreted, would have such meaning to ordinary men.  Of course, it will be likely that, if they 
both do understand their acts in the same way, usual men would have done so, too.  Yet 
the question always remains for the court to interpret the reasonable meaning to the 
acts of the parties, by word or deed, and no characterization of its effect by either party 
thereafter, however truthful, is material.  The rights and obligations depend upon the 
 
151  Hotchkiss, 200 F. at 293. 
152  Id. at 290 (emphasis added). 
153  Id. at 290–92. 
154  Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and its Implications for New 
Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 Geo. L.J. 195, 242 (1998) (“[T]he relevant passage contains an 
important additional, qualifying sentence.  Judge Hand added, ‘[o]f course, if it appear by other 
words, or acts, of the parties, that they attribute a peculiar meaning to such words as they use in 
the contract, that meaning will prevail, but only by virtue of the other words, and not because of 
their unexpressed intent.’  Courts will often quote the first portion of the paragraph, without the 
second.”) (citation omitted). 
155  Hotchkiss, 200 F. at 293. 
156  Lawrence M. Solan, Contract as Agreement, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 353, 377 (2007). 
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law alone.157 
Hand thus disregarded this portion of Carse’s testimony because the parties’ 
understanding “was expressed only in acts, the natural meaning of which does not 
imply any trust relation, as he, and perhaps they, may have supposed.”158  Hand 
noted that “[h]ad they said that they meant to create a trust, such a trust would arise; 
but when they merely adopted a course of conduct, the supposed results of that 
conduct are immaterial.”159 
In 1928, Hand reiterated the often-overlooked qualifying point to his Hotchkiss 
dictum, noting that it was relevant whether something was “disclosed to change the 
normal meaning of the words.”160  In 1939, Hand wrote that although 
with few exceptions the law attaches legal consequences to what parties do, quite 
independently of their private purpose or intent . . . . [i]t is of course always possible that 
the parties to . . . a written contract, may agree between themselves that it shall not have 
the effect upon their rights or obligations which it purports to have . . . . It is not 
necessary that such a mutual understanding shall be explicit or verbal; it may be 
gathered from the conduct of the parties in a series of transactions, or in any other 
way.161 
In 1927, when Hand was on the Second Circuit, he provided insight into his 
famous dictum in Hotchkiss, revealing that it was based on the need for 
predictability in contractual arrangements.162  In United Constr. Co. v. Havermill, two 
towns and a contractor entered into a contract for the building of a bridge.163  After 
the bridge was built, a pier gave way and sank, wrecking the bridge.164  The towns 
sued for breach, arguing that the defendant had failed to excavate for the piers to 
“solid ledge,” as required by the contract, and this was the cause of the piers giving 
way.165  Hand held that “[p]erhaps it was natural for the contractor to conclude that 
the bed alone was intended, and to stop there; but that was not what he undertook 
when he agreed that the ‘excavation . . . shall be done to the line shown.’”166  In the 
final paragraph of the opinion, Hand stated:  
 
157  Hotchkiss, 200 F. at 293–94 (emphasis added). 
158  Id. at 294. 
159  Id. 
160  Moon Motor Car Co., of N.Y. v. Moon Motor Car Co., 29 F.2d 3, 4 (2d Cir. 1928). 
161  Richardson v. Smith, 102 F.2d 697, 699 (2d Cir. 1939). 
162  United Constr. Co. v. Haverhill, N.H., 22 F.2d 256, 256 (2d Cir. 1927). 
163  Id. at 538–39 (prior opinion in 1925 setting forth facts). 
164  Id. 
165  Id. 
166  Id. at 256. 
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So far as we can see, the contractor ignored the terms of his contract and substituted 
what he, perhaps correctly, supposed was everybody’s understanding.  It was a natural, 
but a perilous, course, and, having adopted it, the loss must fall where the words of the 
contract put it.  Contracts are written to avoid such uncertainties, and, however hardly they 
may bear, we have no choice but to make them the measure of the parties’ obligations.167 
Hand thus made it clear that he followed the objective theory of contract, even in 
the face of what might have been both parties’ actual (but unexpressed) 
understanding, because contracts were written to avoid such uncertainties.  In 1940, 
he similarly wrote that “[t]he purpose of a contract is to define the promised 
performance, so that when it becomes due, the parties may know the extent to 
which the promisor is bound . . . .”168  As recognized by a commentator, “[b]y 
requiring evidence beyond contested, post hoc descriptions of the parties’ earlier 
states of mind, the system is able to increase the reliability of its decision-making 
process.”169  
B. Eustis Mining, Post-Hoc Admissions, and Expressed but Unincorporated 
Intentions 
Hand’s second famous opinion espousing the objective theory of contract 
interpretation—Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co.170—involved Hand’s 
rejection of the relevance of a post-hoc damaging admission by a party about his 
state of mind, as well as evidence of what the parties disclosed about their intentions 
prior to or at contract formation, but that were not incorporated into the written 
contract. 
In Eustis Mining, the parties entered into an agreement in 1914 under which 
Eustis would provide cinders to Beer for ten years.171  The agreement was set forth 
in two contracts, and the first contract provided for Eustis to supply the amount 
requested by Beer up to stated maximum amounts, but the second contract (which 
was a subsequent letter written over four months later) provided that Beer would 
purchase all of Eustis’s production.172  After the parties entered into the agreement, 
the First World War caused a substantial increase in Eustis’s production because its 
production of cinders was tied to ore from sulphur producers, and the demand for 
 
167  Id. at 259 (emphasis added). 
168  Art Metals Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 110 F.2d 148, 150 (2d Cir. 1940). 
169  Solan, supra note 156, at 380. 
170  Eustis Mining Co v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co., 239 F. 976, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). 
171  Id. at 978–80. 
172  Id. 
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sulphuric acid was greatly increased.173  The issue was whether Beer was required to 
take all of Eustis’s production, or whether it was limited to 12,000 tons.174  The 
relevant language in the second contract was as follows: “[I]t has been agreed 
between us that we purchase from you for a period of ten (10) years beginning from 
July 1, 1914, and ending July 1, 1924, your total production of lump cinder, estimated 
to be twelve thousand (12,000) tons per year . . . .”175  
The specific issue was whether the phrase “estimated to be twelve thousand 
(12,000) tons per year” limited the obligation to that amount.176  It was undisputed 
that if just the language in the second contract was considered, the agreement 
would require the defendant to take all of the plaintiff’s output.177  The defendant 
argued, however, that construed in conjunction with the first contract it either 
became apparent that the limitation was intended, or that it created an ambiguity 
such that extrinsic evidence of the parties’ meaning was admissible.178 
With respect to reading the two contracts together, Hand noted that it was 
undisputed that the second contract, read alone, “would have bound the defendant 
to accept the total output, regardless of its amount.”179  In addressing whether this 
meaning could be changed by considering the first contract, Hand wrote that “we 
must recognize, not only that there is a critical breaking point . . . beyond which no 
language can be forced, but that in approaching that limit the strain increases.”180  
Hand thus affirmed his belief that the most important aspect of contract 
interpretation was the words the parties chose.  Hand’s review of the two contracts 
led him to conclude that the defendant “was ready to take all that it could get.”181 
Hand then turned to the extrinsic evidence upon which the defendant relied.  
First, the defendant wanted the court to consider a “Proposed Combination 
Agreement of April 8, 1915,” which was a document written by the plaintiff and 
apparently designed to subsume the two existing contracts, and that included the 
provision from the first contract with its quantity limitation.182  Although the 
 
173  Id. at 981. 
174  Id. at 982. 
175  Id. at 980. 
176  Id. at 982. 
177  Id.  
178  Id. 
179  Id. 
180  Id.  
181  Id. at 984. 
182  Id.  
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defendant never assented to the proposed combination agreement, the defendant 
wanted to use this evidence to show what the plaintiff had intended with respect to 
the second contract.183  Hand, however, would not consider it, even though it was 
written evidence sought to be used by the defendant as evidence of what the 
plaintiff intended, rather than simply self-serving testimony by one party of what 
the parties understood the contract to mean, like the evidence in Hotchkiss.184  Hand 
explained: 
This evidence is, I think, irrelevant to the issues, for a reason going to the very nature of 
a contractual obligation.  It is quite true that we commonly speak of a contract as a 
question of intent, and for most purposes it is a convenient paraphrase, accurate 
enough, but, strictly speaking, untrue.  It makes not the least difference whether a 
promisor actually intends that meaning which the law will impose upon his words.  The 
whole House of Bishops might satisfy us that he had intended something else, and it 
would make not a particle of difference in his obligation.  That obligation the law 
attaches to his act of using certain words, provided, of course, the actor be under no 
disability.  The scope of those words will, in the absence of some convention to the 
contrary, be settled, it is true, by what the law supposes men would generally mean when 
they used them; but the promisor’s conformity to type is not a factor in his obligation.  
Hence it follows that no declaration of the promisor as to his meaning when he used the words is 
of the slightest relevancy, however formally competent it may be as an admission.  Indeed, if both 
parties severally declared that their meaning had been other than the natural meaning, and each 
declaration was similar, it would be irrelevant, saving some mutual agreement between them to 
that effect.  When the court came to assign the meaning to their words, it would disregard 
such declarations, because they related only to their state of mind when the contract 
was made, and that has nothing to do with their obligations.  This is, of course, a wholly 
different question from a preceding or subsequent agreement assigning an agreed 
meaning to any given words used in another contract.185  
Hand thus went beyond Hotchkiss and the concern about a self-serving 
declaration, holding that a damaging admission (even a written admission) by a 
party as to his or her intent regarding the contract’s meaning was irrelevant, even 
if it showed the parties shared the same understanding.186  Hand’s use of the phrase 
“severally declared” was important because it showed he rejected the relevance of 
separate declarations by the parties of what they intended the contract to mean, 
 
183  Id. 
184  Id. 
185  Id. at 984–85 (emphasis added).  
186  Hand’s opinion in Eustis Mining Co. has been cited for the proposition that “[a] pure 
objectivist would say that an objective meaning should prevail even when there was an 
inconsistent common understanding.”  Kevin M. Teeven, The Advent of Recovery on Market 
Transactions in the Absence of a Bargain, 39 Am. Bus. L. J. 289, 310 (2002). 
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even if the declarations disclosed a shared understanding.  To be effective, such a 
shared understanding must be part of a prior or subsequent agreement assigning 
that shared understanding to the given words.  This requirement of an agreement 
can be viewed as a significant limitation on Hand’s qualifying remark in Hotchkiss 
that “if it appear[s] by other words, or acts, of the parties, that they attribute a 
peculiar meaning to such words as they use in the contract, that meaning will 
prevail . . . .”187 
The defendant also relied on evidence of the negotiations that attended the 
execution of the second contract.188  One might suspect this would be the type of 
evidence satisfying Hand’s requirement that a shared understanding be part of a 
prior or subsequent agreement assigning that agreed meaning to the given words.  
But Hand refused to consider this evidence as well: 
Since the parties certainly intended, as appears by the mere character of the document, 
to make out of the writing a definitive memorial of their words, that intent the law will 
effect, and it can do so only by disregarding everything but the writing itself.  Hence all 
other verbal expression must be eliminated; the writing is agreed upon as the final 
verbal act.  The ambiguity of the written language does not determine this question in 
any way whatever, in spite of some occasional confusion of language in the books; but 
the exclusion of such negotiations depends upon their agreement to exclude, and 
extends so far as the parties have agreed that it shall exclude all but the written words, 
and no further.  In the case at bar it is plain enough that the parties meant not to rely on 
the oral negotiations; that they wished to have a complete and final written memorial 
of their obligations.  That purpose, being lawful, the court will fulfill by disregarding all 
other verbal expression, except that selected.189 
This too can be seen as a significant limitation on Hand’s qualifying remark in 
Hotchkiss that would permit a showing that the parties attributed a peculiar 
meaning to their contract.190 
A year after Eustis Mining, Hand reaffirmed his belief that the language chosen 
 
187  Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank of NY, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d, Ernst v. Mechanics’ 
Metals Nat. Bank of City of N.Y., 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l City Bank v. Hotchkiss, 
231 U.S. 50 (1913); see also Howe & Rogers Co. v. Lynn, 71 F.2d 283, 284 (2d Cir. 1934) (per curium) 
(“While of course it is true that the intent of the parties is controlling in construing the language 
of a contract or deed, this canon is often misleadingly used.  The private intents of the parties, 
even though they may be shown to be identical, are not the measure of their rights or duties; rather 
that meaning which the law will impute to the words they have used, which is, generally speaking, 
that which a reasonable person would suppose them to carry.”).  While the Howe & Rogers opinion 
was per curium, it seems likely Hand (who was on the panel) was the author.  
188  Eustis Mining Co., 239 F. at 985. 
189  Id.  
190  Hotchkiss, 200 F. at 287, 293. 
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for the written contract trumps the parties’ contrary indications of intent.  In 1918, 
in United States v. Republic Bag & Paper Co.,191 Hand, sitting on the Second Circuit 
while still a trial judge, wrote the majority opinion finding that a contract between 
the government and a paper company was not to be construed as a requirements 
contract, despite language in a proposal suggesting that was the intention.192  The 
proposal, standing alone, indicated that the government desired a requirements 
contract.193  But the contract itself stated that the paper company was to 
“furnish . . . so much of the estimated quantity [of paper] as may be ordered by the 
party of the second part (the Public Printer).”194 Hand wrote that “[t]he 
plaintiff . . . very properly argues that the contract is not to be taken by itself, but in 
conjunction with the Public Printer’s proposal,”195 which had been attached to the 
contract.196  But he then noted, however, that the proposal and the contract 
conflicted and that “we must adopt that which occurs in the actual understanding 
of the parties, rather than in their preliminary negotiations.  Therefore we conclude 
that the contract proper should prevail.”197  Hand continued: “Just why the contract 
varied from the proposals we cannot, of course, surmise, but we cannot with justice 
disregard the fact that it did vary . . . .”198 
In 1945, Hand reiterated his opposition to the use of what the parties said 
during negotiations as evidence of a term’s meaning.199  In Rothkopf v. Lowry & Co.,200 
he stated that “as an interpretative gloss upon the meaning of the words actually 
used, that testimony was incompetent, for the contract was plainly to be a final 
memorial of the promises . . . .”201  Rather, Hand relied on “the underlying purpose 
of the contract” to determine the language’s meaning.202  Hand apparently only 
 
191  U.S. v. Republic Bag & Paper Co., 250 F. 79 (2d Cir. 1918). 
192  Id. at 81. 
193  Id.  
194  Id. at 80. 
195  Id. at 81.  The proposals being attached to the contract is presumably what made it proper for 
the defendant to rely upon them, as otherwise they would have been inadmissible evidence of 
what the parties said to each other during preliminary negotiations. 
196  Id. at 79. 
197  Id. at 81. 
198  Id.  
199  Rothkopf v. Lowry & Co., 148 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1945). 
200  Id. at 519. 
201  Id. at 520 (citing Restatement (First) of Contracts, supra note 77, at § 237). 
202  Id.  
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relented when required to follow state law.  In 1949, following New York law in the 
post-Erie era, he wrote: “[T]he law of New York—to which we must look to learn the 
meaning of the contract—admits previous negotiations to show [the term’s] 
meaning . . . .”203 
Hand’s refusal to consider statements of the parties’ intentions made during 
negotiations preceding a written contract was consistent with Williston’s approach, 
which was based on the idea that when parties adopt a writing as a statement of 
their bargain, they intend to exclude such evidence.204  In such a situation, “[t]he 
parties have assented to those words as binding upon them.”205  Williston wrote that 
“[w]here . . . they incorporate their agreement into a writing they have attempted 
more than to assent by means of symbols to certain things, they have assented to the 
writing as the adequate expression of the things to which they agree.”206  Williston again 
expressed this view in the Restatement of Contracts, published in 1932.  The Restatement 
provided that the interpretation of an integrated agreement should take into 
account “all operative usages and . . . all the circumstances prior to and 
contemporaneous with the making of the integration, other than oral statements by 
the parties of what they intended it to mean.”207  Williston, Reporter for the Restatement 
of Contracts, wrote that where parties  
integrate their agreement they have attempted more than to assent by means of 
symbols to certain things.  They have assented to the writing as the expression of the 
things to which they agree, therefore the terms of the writing are conclusive, and a 
contract may have a meaning different from that which either party supposed it to 
have.208 
Thus, for Hand and Williston, it was the parol evidence rule and Thayer’s 
merger rationale that precluded the use of statements made by the parties as proof 
of the parties’ intentions, even (at least for Hand) post-formation admissions of 
what a party’s intent had been at the time of formation.  Traditionally, direct 
statements of intention had been excluded because of fear that they would be given 
too great weight by the judge or the jury.209  For Hand, however, it was based on the 
belief that the parties intended the written terms (as interpreted by a court) to 
control over the parties’ beliefs about the contract’s meaning, even if the parties 
 
203  Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Foullon, 171 F.2d 905, 908 (2d Cir. 1949). 
204  Samuel L. Williston, 2 The Law of Contracts § 606, at 1165 (1920). 
205  Id. 
206  Id. at 1165 (emphasis added). 
207  Restatement (First) of Contracts, supra note 77, at § 230 (emphasis added). 
208  Id. cmt. b. 
209  Thayer, supra note 34, at 429–31, 440.  
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intended the same meaning.210  Hand did not place the written words above the 
parties’ intentions, he believed the written words were the parties’ intentions.  And 
a “preceding . . . agreement assigning an agreed meaning to any given words used 
in another contract” would not include agreements during negotiations that were 
not included in a subsequent written contract because the failure to include them 
indicated an intention to exclude them. 
C. Rejection of Plain Meaning and the Importance of Context 
Hand, however, although believing that the parties’ actual beliefs about a 
written contract’s meaning were irrelevant, at the same time rejected the idea that 
words have a plain meaning.  Throughout his judicial career, Hand demonstrated 
he was willing to admit other extrinsic evidence to determine meaning.  As one 
commentator notes, “Judge Hand . . . recognized that there were certain individual 
transactions where strict standards of contract interpretation would not apply or 
would be overcome.”211  In fact, Hand displayed this willingness to find ambiguity 
and admit extrinsic evidence in his first notable contracts opinion in 1910, just a 
year after joining the bench.  
The opinion—Lorraine Manufacturing Co. v. Oshinsky212—was a denial of a motion 
for a new trial.213  The case involved a claim for breach of a contract of sale, with the 
plaintiff seller alleging that the goods were wrongfully rejected by the defendant 
buyer.214  The defendant argued that the goods, delivered on November 16, were 
delivered one day late.215  The issue was whether the following contract provision 
required delivery on November 15: “Below we hand you copy of your order for 
spring, 1908, which the mills have accepted, and which they will deliver to 
 
210  This aspect of Hand’s approach to contract interpretation—deeming irrelevant an admission 
by a party about a contract’s meaning, one that would establish even a shared understanding by 
the parties—was particularly troublesome to Professor Arthur Corbin.  In 1944, Corbin wrote an 
article on the parol evidence rule, and included a criticism of the view that statements about 
meaning made during preliminary negotiations should be considered irrelevant.  See Arthur L. 
Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 Yale L.J. 603, 625 (1944); see also Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on 
Contracts § 543 (one vol. ed. 1952) (again criticizing the view). 
211  Michael Z. Green, Preempting Justice Through Binding Arbitration of Future Disputes: Mere 
Adhesion Contracts or a Trap for the Unwary Consumer, 5 Loy. Consumer L. Rep. 112, 112 (1993). 
212  Lorraine Mfg. Co. v. Oshinsky, 182 F. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1910), rev’d, Oshinsky v. Lorraine Mfg. Co., 
187 F. 120 (2d Cir. 1911). 
213  Id. at 409. 
214  Oshinsky, 187 F. at 120–21. 
215  Id. at 121. 
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you * * * at the specified dates: * * * Stock: Nov. 15.”216  
Hand had apparently permitted oral testimony about the provision’s meaning 
(the details of the testimony are not provided), and the jury thereafter returned a 
verdict for the plaintiff.217  The defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that 
admitting the testimony was error because the contract language was “too clear to 
require any oral explanation.”218  Hand displayed little difficulty holding that the 
provision was ambiguous and that oral explanation about the provision was 
admissible, relying primarily on his own judgment about common speech rather 
than case law precedent.219  He explained that when persons intend to specify a 
specific date, they say “on July 4th,” not “at July 4th,” and that when persons use the 
phrase “at Christmas” or “at Easter” they imply a certain latitude regarding the 
date.220  Hand did not conclude that “at . . . November 15th” necessarily meant there 
was such latitude, only that there was doubt about its meaning and that it was a jury 
question, with extrinsic evidence admissible because of the ambiguity.221  
Interestingly, Hand was reversed on appeal, the Second Circuit writing: 
We think that the language of the provision is plain, unequivocal, and free from 
ambiguity, and required delivery on November 15th, and not later.  We fail to appreciate 
the contention of the plaintiff that the language may fairly be given two meanings.  A 
provision for delivery at a specified date, followed by the specification of a date, requires 
delivery upon that date and none other.  The preposition ‘at’ seems quite as definite and 
certain as any word that could be used.  Consequently, as the goods were not delivered 
or tendered until after November 15th, we think that the plaintiff failed to establish its 
cause of action, and that judgment should have been directed for the defendants.222 
Even if a contract provision seemed on its face to have a plain meaning, Hand 
believed that extrinsic evidence was admissible to give the provision meaning, 
maintaining that the literal meaning of a writing was not a reliable test.223  Forty 
years after Oshinsky, Hand cited with approval the following Restatement comment: 
The court in interpreting words or other acts of the parties puts itself in the position 
which they occupied at the time the contract was made.  In applying the appropriate 
standard of interpretation even to an agreement that on its face is free from ambiguity 
 
216  Id. 
217  Id. at 120. 
218  Oshinsky, 182 F. at 407. 
219  Id. at 408. 
220  Id.  
221  Id. 
222  Oshinsky, 187 F. at 121. 
223  Fed. Liquidating Corp. v. SEC, 187 F.2d 804, 807 (2d Cir. 1951). 
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it is permissible to consider the situation of the parties and the accompanying 
circumstances at the time it was entered into—not for the purpose of modifying or 
enlarging or curtailing its terms, but to aid in determining the meaning to be given to 
the agreement.224 
Throughout his career, Hand followed this approach.  In 1927, in Crescent 
Insulated Wire & Cable Co. v. Pratt Chuck Co., the issue involved the interpretation of a 
satisfaction clause and when the parties intended title to pass under the contract.225  
Hand stated that the court’s conclusion rested “both upon the language used and 
the situation of the parties,” and he then described in detail the parties’ situation to 
support the court’s interpretation,226 then stating that its conclusion was based 
upon “the whole setting.”227  In 1928, in Moon Motor Car Co. of New York v. Moon Motor 
Car Co., Inc., Hand stated, with respect to a matter of contract interpretation, that 
“the setting in which words are used . . . is always competent, and usually necessary, 
to their understanding.”228  Hand therefore refused to interpret the contract at issue 
based solely on its language, and without the aid of additional evidence.229  
In 1929, in Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd Brasileird v. C. G. Blake Co., Hand stated 
that “parties must always be assumed to refer, to the past transaction between 
them . . . .”230  At issue in that particular case was a promise to deliver six “cargoes” 
of coal and the amount the parties intended to be shipped.231  Hand held that 
“‘[c]argoes’ meant cargoes as they had dealt in them, not as others had.”232  He then 
stated that “[t]his is, of course, a very common way to ascertain the meaning of 
language,” and that recourse to custom might have been necessary had there not 
been such a course of dealing.233  With evidence of how the parties had treated the 
term, Hand held that it was an error for the trial court to instruct the jury on the 
issue of custom.234  In 1951, in Rumsey Manufacturing Corp. v. U.S. Hoffman Machinery 
 
224  Id. at 807 (citing Restatement (First) of Contracts, supra note 77, at § 235 cmt. e). 
225  Crescent Insulated Wire & Cable Co. v. Pratt Chuck Co., 18 F.2d 734, 734 (2d Cir. 1927). 
226  Id. at 735. 
227  Id. at 736. 
228  Moon Motor Car Co., of N.Y., v. Moon Motor Car Co., 29 F.2d 3, 4 (2d Cir. 1928) (emphasis 
added). 
229  Id. 
230  Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd Brasileird v. C. G. Blake Co., 34 F.2d 616, 618 (2d Cir. 1929). 
231  Id.  
232  Id.  
233  Id.  
234  Id.  
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Corp., Hand looked to a provision’s purpose in interpreting it.235  With respect to the 
type of extrinsic evidence that would be relevant, Hand believed that it could be 
anything “except [as previously discussed] what the parties said to each other 
outside the writing.”236  
Hand’s opinion in Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co. provides the clearest 
insight into his belief about the interplay between the contract’s words being the 
best evidence of the parties’ intentions and surrounding circumstances being 
admissible to give meaning to those words.237  Hand held that “[a]ll the attendant 
facts constituting the setting of a contract are admissible, so long as they are 
helpful,” but the extent of their helpfulness is based on whether the language is 
ambiguous and the extent of the ambiguity.238  Here, not only did Hand disclose a 
willingness to consider the contract’s surrounding circumstances, he rejected the 
idea that words can have a fixed meaning: 
The admissibility of the general surroundings in which the contract was written 
(Merriam v. U.S., 107 U.S. 437, 441, 2 Sup.Ct. 536, 27 L.Ed. 531), rests upon quite a different 
basis [than the other extrinsic evidence relied on by the defendant], one which can be 
said with a nearer approach to accuracy to turn upon the ambiguity of the written 
words.  All the attendant facts constituting the setting of a contract are admissible, so 
long as they are helpful; the extent of their assistance depends upon the different 
meanings which the language itself will let in.  Hence we may say, truly perhaps, that, if 
the language is not ambiguous, no evidence is admissible, meaning no more than that 
it could not control the sense, if we did let it in; indeed, it might ‘contradict‘ the 
contract—that is, the actual words should be remembered to have a higher probative 
value, when explicit, than can safely be drawn by inference from surroundings.  Yet, as 
all language will bear some different meanings, some evidence is always admissible; the line of 
exclusion depends on how far the words will stretch, and how alien is the intent they are asked to 
include.239 
 
235  Rumsey Mfg. Corp. v. U.S. Hoffman Mach. Corp., 187 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir. 1951). 
236  Moon Motor Car Co., of N.Y. v. Moon Motor Car Co., 29 F.2d 3, 4 (2d Cir. 1928). 
237  Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co., 239 F. 976, 985–86 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). 
238  Id. at 985. 
239  Id. (emphasis added).  The Court in Merriam stated that “[i]t is a fundamental rule that in the 
construction of contracts the courts may look not only to the language employed, but to the 
subject-matter and the surrounding circumstances, and may avail themselves of the same light 
which the parties possessed when the contract was made.”  Merriam v. United States, 107 U.S. 437, 
441 (1883).  Williston, in his 1920 treatise, referring to Hand’s opinion, stated that “[t]he correct 
principle has been well summarized in [this] recent decision,”  2  Samuel L. Williston, The Law 
of Contracts, § 630 (1920), and he then quoted the above passage.  Id. at 1216-17.  Hand’s language 
was included almost verbatim in the Restatement of Contracts in 1932.  See Restatement (First) of 
Contracts, supra note 77, at § 235 (“Yet, as all language will bear some different meanings, 
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Hand was clear, however, that evidence of the general situation of the parties, to be 
of assistance in understanding the meaning of their words, must have been 
disclosed to each other.240  
Hand’s rejection of the idea that words can have a plain meaning outside of 
their context is perhaps best exemplified by his opinion in E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard 
Steamship Co., in which Hand refused to apply contract language literally when it 
conflicted with the contract’s purpose.241  In E. Gerli the libelant sued the respondent 
for the loss of two bales of silk shipped on a steamship from Southampton to New 
York.242  The respondent relied on a clause in the bill of lading providing that “[t]he 
carrier is not liable . . . for any claim for short delivery of, or damage to, the property 
hereby receipted for, unless notice of such claim is given in writing before removal 
of . . . such part of the Goods as are discharged from the vessel at the port of discharge.”243  
Hand recognized that:  
Taken literally, this would mean, in case all the goods were discharged from the vessel, 
and some were later lost on the pier, that the notice need never be given, because all 
those discharged were never removed; and the clause would then cover only the case of 
goods lost on board.244   
Because it was usually impossible to prove whether goods were lost on board or after 
discharge, Hand noted that the clause would usually have no effect.245  Hand thus 
held that such a literal interpretation could not prevail: 
It is indeed true that the language of a bill of lading must be taken against the carrier, 
but it appears to us that the interpretation suggested would too plainly contradict its 
purpose.  Therefore, we read the phrase, ‘discharged from the vessel,’ as meaning not 
that the goods have merely gone over the ship’s side to the wharf, but that they have been 
delivered to the shipper.  Anything else, for the reasons just given, would upon most 
occasions delete it from the contract, and cannot be thought to be its meaning.246 
Hand then held that “it would seem to be the only fair meaning of the clause that if 
he [the shipper] knows of the shortage, he must give notice at least before taking 
 
evidence of surroundings is always admissible.  Its operative effect depends on how far the words 
will stretch, and how alien from the ordinary meaning of the words is the intent they are asked to 
include.”). 
240  Eustis Mining Co., 239 F. at 985. 
241  E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 48 F.2d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1931). 
242  Id. at 115. 
243  Id. at 115–16 (emphasis added). 
244  Id. at 116. 
245  Id. 
246  Id.  
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that which he understands to be the last installment.”247  In 1945 Hand, in the context 
of statutory interpretation, reiterated this point, writing: 
[I]t is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the primary, and ordinarily 
the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a 
contract, or anything else.  But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed 
jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes 
always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative 
discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.248 
Hand also had no difficulty deviating from a language’s literal meaning when 
the parties had acted in a way consistent with a different meaning.  In Town of 
Readsboro v. Hoosac Tunnell & W. R. Co.,249 the town and the defendant’s predecessor 
(who owned a railroad) entered into a contract under which the parties agreed to 
share equally the expense of maintaining a bridge.250  The predecessor conveyed the 
railroad to the defendant, and the defendant promised to comply with all contracts 
binding on the predecessor.251  The defendant argued that the contract between the 
town and the defendant’s predecessor was ultra vires, and thus the defendant had 
no obligation to comply with it because the defendant only promised to assume 
those obligations that were “binding” on the predecessor.252  Hand, however, 
rejected this argument, even if the original contract had not been binding on the 
predecessor: 
We do not forget that in each deed the grantee undertakes to assume only those 
obligations which are “binding” upon the grantor, and that strictly the contract was 
binding on the Deerfield River Company only in case it was intra vires.  Yet it is plain, 
from the subsequent conduct of the parties, that by that language they meant to include 
the contract in suit among the obligations of the Deerfield River Company which its two 
successors assumed.  We think it too late now to raise the question whether as matter 
of strict construction the Deerfield River Company was originally bound.  Hence, even 
though the original contract was ultra vires, an action lies as upon a new promise made 
for the benefit of a third person . . . .253 
Similarly, a year later, in Nolte v. Hudson Navigation Co.,254 Hand held that 
ambiguous language would be construed in accordance with how the parties 
 
247  Id. 
248  Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), aff’d, 326 U.S. 404 (1945). 
249  Town of Readsboro v. Hoosac Tunnel & W.R. Co., 6 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1925). 
250  Id. at 734. 
251  Id.  
252  Id. at 734–35. 
253  Id. at 735. 
254  Nolte v. Nudson Nav. Co., 16 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1926). 
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treated it during the life of the contract, writing: 
At least, when parties choose such equivocal language, they must be content with the 
interpretation which they put upon it immediately thereafter, and to which they 
continuously adhered for nearly 25 years.  While the new pier and bulkhead were 
building, the company asserted its right under the contract to a new shed located 
relatively to the new bulkhead as the old shed was located relatively to the old bulkhead, 
and the city assented, not as the grant of a new right, but as something included within 
the old. 
Nobody read any other meaning into the words until this claim was filed, and everybody 
concerned acted on the assumption that the first interpretation had been right.  The 
canon of contemporaneous and subsequent construction of a contract 
applies . . . . Hence we conclude that the contract meant to give the company, for the 
maintenance of the new shed, whatever rights it had had to maintain the old shed.255 
Thus, consistent with Hand’s concern for predictability in contractual relations, if 
the parties had engaged in a course of performance that suggested a shared 
understanding, that shared understanding would control.  Hand obviously believed 
this was different from post-formation admissions about meaning, which had not 
been acted upon. 
For Hand, the parties’ purpose in entering into the contract or including a 
particular provision was important.  Consider the following from a 1953 opinion: 
[A]lthough they were used of a statute, the often quoted words of Holmes, J. apply with 
even greater force to a contract: “The major premise of the conclusion expressed in a 
statute, the change of policy that induces the enactment, may not be set out in terms, 
but it is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say: We see what you are driving 
at, but you have not said it, and we shall go on as before.”  It is as impossible to lay down 
any postulates for ‘strict construction’ as it is for ordinary ‘construction.’  When parties 
have not explicitly covered the occasion which has arisen, a court will always strive to 
ascertain whether their disclosed purpose does not demand a more inclusive ‘intent.’  
And by their ‘intent’ we can understand nothing else than how they would have disposed 
of the occasion had they been faced with it at the outset.  There is a hazard about doing 
that; but it is inevitable if the purpose is not often to be defeated and all courts do it 
more or less.  When we say that we will adopt a ‘strict construction,’ we mean that we 
will press with unusual persistence the doubts that cannot but inhere in the function 
anyway, and that we will be satisfied with no extension of the literal meaning unless it 
satisfies every logical compunction.256 
If, however, context did not support a party’s argument much, it would not 
override the meaning suggested by the contract language chosen by the parties.  For 
 
255  Id. at 184. 
256  Prudence-Bonds Corp. v. State St. Trust Co., 202 F.2d 555, 563–64 (2d Cir. 1953) (quoting 
Johnson v. U.S., 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908)).  
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example, returning to Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co.,257 Hand found in 
that case that the general surroundings did not support the defendant’s argument 
much, and that the language of the contract indicated no limit on quantity: 
I agree that the production occasioned by the Great War was a surprise to both sides, 
and that it was not within their forecast of the future.  It is altogether likely that the 
defendant would have cried off upon the whole bargain, had they thought it probable.  
Contracts cannot, however, be treated so loosely; if parties wish more certainty, they 
must use more certain words.  The case, therefore, ends where it starts, with the initial 
acceptance clause as the best indication of what the meaning was; it admits of no 
interpretation which does not distort it beyond what the words will bear.258 
Thus, if the parties wanted more certainty regarding the amount of output, “they 
must use more certain words.”259 
Hand therefore rejected the idea that words can have a plain meaning outside 
of the context in which they are used.  As previously discussed, he would enforce an 
agreement where the words would have a peculiar meaning, provided that the 
parties had made such an agreement.  But Hand was also willing to consider a broad 
array of other evidence in determining meaning, provided that the words were 
sufficiently susceptible of the meaning proposed.  He made clear that surrounding 
circumstances were always relevant, and that a requirement of ambiguity meant no 
more than that the extrinsic evidence, if admitted, must be capable of giving the 
language the asserted meaning.  Hand would also enforce a shared understanding 
of a contract’s meaning when the parties had acted upon that meaning.  And when 
deciding whether the words were sufficiently susceptible to the meaning proposed, 
Hand was willing to find an agreement to give words a meaning that conflicted with 
their literal meaning.  
D. James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc. and Implied Promises 
Hand also had little difficulty using context to find an implied promise, as he 
showed in 1910, just a year after joining the bench.  In Colgate v. James T. White & 
Co.,260 the parties entered into a contract under which the plaintiff agreed to provide 
the defendant with information about the plaintiff’s life for use in a cyclopedia.261  
The plaintiff thereafter sought an injunction to prevent the information from being 
used, arguing that the defendant had represented that the cyclopedia would be 
 
257  Eustis Mining Co., 239 F. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).  
258  Id. at 986. 
259  Id. 
260  Colgate v. James T. White & Co., 180 F. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1910). 
261  Id. at 885. 
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issued under the auspices of the U.S. Government, and that it was in fact to be 
published in a cyclopedia that was not under such auspices.262  Hand found the 
defendant promised to publish the biography in a cyclopedia under the auspices of 
the U.S. Government, noting that the defendant “let the interview proceed after it 
would have been apparent to any reasonable man that Colgate was acting under a 
misapprehension, and supposed that the facts would not be published in the usual 
kind of biography.”263  Hand then found that this promise implied a negative 
covenant to not publish it elsewhere, stating that “[t]he commonest good faith 
requires the implication that he would not abuse the opportunity so given him by 
publishing them in a work which he from the outset found it necessary to assure 
Colgate that this was not.”264  
In Moon Motor Car Co.,265 Hand stated that the fact that a contract did not 
include an express promise to sell would not be final as to whether there was such a 
commitment.266  He cited, in addition to other cases, Benjamin Cardozo’s famous 
opinion in Wood v. Duff-Gordon, in which the New York Court of Appeals inferred a 
promise to use best efforts to market products.267  And in one case Hand found an 
implied promise to forbear in exchange for a lien, stating: 
It is quite true that here there was no express reference to forbearance in the contract 
and no statement that the lien was in exchange for it, but the situation reasonably 
implied that the parties so intended it. . . . The cause of its inaction was the promised 
lien; it cannot be supposed that the connection between that inaction and the 
agreement to give security was wholly unconscious.268 
But Hand’s most famous opinion dealing with implied promises is his 1933 
opinion in James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., in which he refused to infer a promise 
by a subcontractor to keep its bid open long enough for a general contractor to rely 
on the bid in obtaining the prime contract and then accept the subcontractor’s 
 
262  Id. at 883. 
263  Id. at 885. 
264  Id. at 886. 
265  Moon Motor Car Co., of N.Y., v. Moon Motor Car Co., 29 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1928). 
266  Id. at 4. 
267  Id. (citing Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917)). 
268  In re All Star Feature Corp., 232 F. 1004, 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). 
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offer.269  This opinion has been described as “purely formalistic,”270 “a model of the 
formalistic application of contract doctrine”271 and “a pillar of traditional, formal, 
Willistonian contract analysis.”272  According to one commentator, this was a case 
in which “Hand viewed the commercial transaction at issue through the lens of 
individualism and formalism”273 and resting “on the twin related ideological 
insights of ‘protect yourself’ and ‘indifference’; in other words, the central tenets of 
atomistic individualism embodied in the law of contracts.”274  In fact, the opinion 
was even too Willistonian for Williston.275  Several years later, Hand’s former 
professor rejected the result in the second edition of his treatise published in 1936.276  
One commentator wrote in 1990 that Hand’s opinion in Baird “died on the vine.  
Even now, fifty-seven years later, not a single decision follows it.”277  
Baird arose out of a subcontractor who submitted a bid to general contractors 
for all the linoleum needed for a public building project, the bid being subject to 
“prompt acceptance” after the general contractor was awarded the prime 
contract.278  The subcontractor, however, had underestimated the amount of 
linoleum required by the specifications.279  A general contractor used the 
subcontractor’s bid in calculating its own bid for the prime contract.280  When the 
 
269  James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933); see also Avery Katz, When 
Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Contract Negotiations, 105 Yale L.J. 1249, 
1261 (1996) (referring to James Baird Co. as “one of Judge Hand's most celebrated opinions and a 
warhorse of the casebooks.”). 
270  Alfred S. Konefsky, Freedom and Interdependence in Twentieth-Century Contract Law: Traynor and 
Hand and Promissory Estoppel, 65 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1169, 1197 (1997). 
271  Id. at 1196. 
272  Id. at 1199. 
273  Id. at 1173. 
274  Id. at 1200. 
275  1 Samuel L. Williston, The Law of Contracts § 139 n.25 (rev. ed. 1936). 
276  Id.; see also Subcontractor’s Offer for Bilateral Contract Held Irrevocable Because of Contractor’s 
Foreseeable Reliance, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 355, 356 (1959) (noting Williston’s rejection of Hand’s 
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But see Se. Sales & Serv. Co. v. T. T. Watson, Inc., 172 So. 2d 239, 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) 
(refusing to apply promissory estoppel to make subcontractor’s bid irrevocable). 
278  James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344, 345 (2d Cir. 1933). 
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subcontractor learned of its mistake, it telegraphed the general contractor, but the 
telegram was not received until after the general contractor had submitted its bid 
for the prime contract.281  The deadline for submitting bids to the public authorities 
had passed, and because the linoleum was just a small part of the whole project, and 
a withdrawal of the general contractor’s bid would have cost it the prime contract 
and probably resulted in the forfeiture of its deposit, the general contractor did not 
withdraw its bid.282  The public authorities accepted the general contractor’s bid, 
and the general contractor then attempted to accept the subcontractor’s bid, but the 
subcontractor refused to recognize a contract.283  The general contractor then sued 
the subcontractor for breach.284  The general contractor argued that when it used 
the subcontractor’s bid, “they accepted the [subcontractor’s] offer and promised to 
pay for the linoleum, in case their bid was accepted.”285 
Citing to the Restatement (First) of Contracts, Hand began his analysis by stating 
the general rule that an offer must be accepted before it is revoked, noting that the 
acceptance was therefore too late “[u]nless there are circumstances to take it out of 
the ordinary doctrine . . . .”286  Hand viewed the case as one involving the 
interpretation of the transaction, “and the question is merely as to what they meant; 
that is, what is to be imputed to the words they used.”287  
Hand rejected the argument that the general contractor accepted the 
subcontractor’s offer merely by putting in a bid to the public authorities.288  Hand 
relied on the fact that there would be no claim for breach against the general 
contractor if the general contractor repudiated the prime contract, or went 
bankrupt, after being awarded it.289  Also, the subcontractor’s bid stated that it was 
only available for acceptance upon being awarded the prime contract,290 and its 
reference to the bid being subject to “prompt acceptance” after being awarded the 
prime contract indicated “the usual communication of an acceptance, and 
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286  Id. at 345 (citing Restatement (First) of Contracts, supra note 77, at § 35). 
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precludes the idea that the use of the offer in the bidding shall be the equivalent.”291  
Hand noted that “[i]t may indeed be argued that this last language contemplated no 
more than an early notice that the offer had been accepted, the actual acceptance 
being the bid, but that would wrench its natural meaning too far . . . .”292  Hand then 
noted that “[t]he contractors had a ready escape from their difficulty by insisting 
upon a contract before they used the figures; and in commercial transactions it does 
not in the end promote justice to seek strained interpretations in aid of those who 
do not protect themselves.”293  
This portion of Hand’s opinion is uncontroversial, as the general rule to this day 
is that a general contractor’s use of a subcontractor’s bid is not an acceptance, 
absent a contrary agreement between the parties.294  In fact, this is true even if the 
subcontractor states that any use of its bid by the general contractor is an 
acceptance.295 
The plaintiff also argued, however, that even if a bilateral contract had not 
formed, the defendant should be liable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.296  
Hand rejected the argument, holding that an offer is not a promise because “an offer 
for an exchange is not meant to become a promise until a consideration has been 
received, either a counter-promise or whatever else is stipulated.”297  The 
subcontractor’s offer would become “a promise to deliver” only “when the plaintiff 
promised to take and pay for it.”298  Merely using the bid was a matter of indifference 
to the subcontractor and not what it was seeking in return.299  Without a promise 
by the subcontractor, there was “no room . . . for the doctrine of ‘promissory 
estoppel.’”300 
Hand also held that the offer could not be considered an option, making the 
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offer irrevocable and giving the general contractor the power, after being awarded 
the prime contract, to either accept the offer or get a better deal from another 
subcontractor.301  Hand stated that “[t]here is not the least reason to suppose that 
the defendant meant to subject itself to such a one-sided obligation.”302  As noted by 
a commentator, “In justifying the result in Baird, Hand maintained his vision of 
freedom of contract. He would not force commercial actors into agreements that 
they did not wish to enter.”303  Hand acknowledged, however, that if the 
subcontractor’s bid could be construed as including a promise to keep the offer 
open, the doctrine of promissory estoppel might apply.304 
Although Hand’s opinion is viewed as formalistic, this ignores important parts 
of Hand’s analysis.  Critics view Hand’s analysis as simply implementing a 
formalistic syllogism as follows: 
Major premise = An offer can be revoked before an acceptance, unless the offeror 
promises to keep it open. 
Minor premise = The subcontractor did not promise to keep its offer open. 
Conclusion = The subcontractor could revoke its offer before the general contractor 
accepted it. 
What is often overlooked, however, is that Hand was willing to entertain the use of 
promissory estoppel if the subcontractor had promised to keep the offer open, but 
the circumstances of the transaction suggested that the subcontractor had not 
made such an implied promise, as it would open the subcontractor up to a “one-
sided obligation.”305  Before Hand would infer such an obligation, he expected, as 
always, some extrinsic evidence that the parties intended that obligation, and there 
was no evidence the subcontractor intended to be subject to such a one-sided 
obligation.  In fact, Hand’s opinion in Baird has been cited as an example of his belief  
that contracting parties can adapt quite well to formal categories so long as the 
application of such categories remains clear and stable, and that substantive 
approaches [to contract interpretation], especially when applied by nonspecialist judges 
operating at a distance from the commercial setting and susceptible to influence by a 
host of popular and ideological considerations, tend to undermine the certainty of 
exchange and to defeat the parties' intentions.306 
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In fact, a study of the industry determined that general contractors themselves 
do not want to be bound until after they are awarded the prime contract, and  
There is evidence that the principle reason why a general [contractor] might wish to 
preserve freedom of action is to be in a position to ‘shop’ or ‘peddle’ the particular sub’s 
offer, after securing the contract for the main job.”307   
The study’s author concluded 
that a legal rule making the sub’s offer irrevocable [in a case in which a subcontractor 
revoked the offer because of a rise in the cost of materials] was not needed and would 
put subs at a still greater disadvantage, and that it would be wiser to leave the problem 
to be worked out by voluntary action of the interested parties.308   
This suggests that Hand’s reluctance to infer a promise without sufficient evidence, 
and to leave the matter to agreement between the parties, was the correct 
response.309 
As recognized by one commentator, it was the lack of evidence to infer a 
promise that in one respect distinguishes Hand’s opinion in Baird from the contrary 
holding by Justice Roger Traynor in Drennan v. Star Paving Co.: 
Evidence or absence of evidence of business usage explains in part why 
Learned Hand thought the general contractor in James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Brothers, 
Inc. was foolish for relying on the subcontractor’s bid before entering into a bilateral 
contract with the subcontractor, but Roger Traynor found that the general contractor’s 
reliance in Drennan v. Star Paving Co. was “reasonable” and “foreseeable.”  In Drennan, 
the “plaintiff testified that it was customary in that area for general contractors to 
receive the bids of subcontractors by telephone on the day set for bidding and to rely 
on  them in computing their own bids.”  In Baird, there was no evidence that, as a matter 
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I now think sometimes sentimental—ruminations of Roger Traynor.”) (footnotes omitted); 
Michael J. Cozzillio, The Option Contract: Irrevocable not Irrejectable, 39 Cath. U. L. Rev. 491, 556 n.74 
(1990) (“Arguably, the Drennan approach exceedingly tilts in favor of the general 
contractor/offeree.”); Note, The Uniform Commercial Code as a Premise for Judicial Reasoning, 65 
Colum. L. Rev. 880, 889 (1965) (“In the case of a construction contract, for example, when a firm 
bid is required of a subcontractor, the Code rule making firm offers enforceable might well 
aggravate his already inferior bargaining position.”). 
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of trade usage, contractors relied on subcontractors’ bids.310 
Thus, Hand was willing to infer a promise if there was sufficient evidence to infer a 
promise, but he was unwilling to infer a promise as a matter of policy in the absence 
of such evidence.  
Even Justice Traynor in Drennan seemingly acknowledged the court was 
abandoning notions of agreement and implementing social policy, stating that 
“[w]hether implied in fact or law, the subsidiary promise [to not revoke the offer] 
serves to preclude the injustice that would result if the offer could be revoked after 
the offeree had acted in detrimental reliance thereon.”311  Traynor was apparently 
willing to infer such a promise as a matter of law if there was insufficient evidence 
to infer it from the facts.  The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which adopts Drennan 
as black letter, as much as admits any such promise is implied in law, making no 
reference to an implied promise to keep the offer open but referring to foreseeable 
reliance on the offer.312  For Hand, it was not the courts’ role in contracts cases such 
as Baird to implement such social policy, since the parties had the ability to protect 
themselves. 
C ONC L US I ON 
An analysis of Hand’s opinions involving contract interpretation, rather than 
simply relying on his famous dicta about the objective theory of contract, shows that 
Hand’s reputation as a great commercial formalist lawyer with a crusader’s zeal for 
the objective theory of contract is an overly simplistic view of his approach to 
contract interpretation.  Hand believed certainty in the interpretation of contracts 
was vital and that courts should ultimately determine a contract’s meaning based 
primarily on the contract’s words. He rejected, however, the notion that words can 
have a plain meaning outside of their context, and he believed that the contract’s 
meaning should be based on what a reasonable person would believe the parties 
intended.  
In determining meaning, the court should consider many types of evidence, 
including the contract’s purpose, the surrounding circumstances, and how the 
parties treated the particular contract term during performance.  Hand simply 
 
310  Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1, 28–29 
(footnotes omitted). 
311  Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 760 (Cal. 1958) (emphases added). 
312  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 87(2) (Am. Law Inst. 1981); see also Sidney W. 
DeLong, Placid, Clear-Seeming Words: Some Realism About the New Formalism (With Particular 
Reference to Promissory Estoppel), 38 San Diego L. Rev. 13, 14 n.3 (2001) (referring to § 87(2) as 
“offertory estoppel”). 
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believed that the language chosen was the best evidence of intent and believed that 
at a certain point extrinsic evidence of meaning would be so at odds with the 
language used that it would stretch the provision’s meaning to the breaking point.  
But that breaking point was surprisingly far, such that he believed “at November 
15”313 could be reasonably interpreted to mean “about November 15,”314 “discharged 
from the vessel”315 could be reasonably interpreted to mean “delivered to the 
shipper,”316 and “binding”317 obligations could be reasonably interpreted to include 
a non-binding ultra vires contract.318  Hand’s reasonable person was not a strict 
constructionist who simply looked at a contract’s four corners when interpreting a 
contract. 
Hand was also willing to infer promises, even relying on Cardozo’s famous 
opinion in Wood v. Lady Duff-Gordon.319  But he would only do so if he believed there 
was sufficient evidence to infer them and was unwilling to infer a promise without 
evidentiary support simply to save a party from the consequences of insufficient 
foresight.  He believed that it was the role of the legislatures and the parties, not that 
of the courts, to protect parties from their failure to make their contractual 
intentions clear to the other party.  
Likewise, Hand’s rejection of the relevance of post-hoc declarations by the 
parties of what they thought the contract meant was based on his belief that 
predictability in contractual relations requires that contracts be created by 
agreement, not undisclosed intentions.  His position that statements made during 
negotiations leading to a written contract were irrelevant was in fact his attempt to 
effectuate the parties’ intentions—his belief that parties intend an integrated 
agreement to supersede such negotiations, even when those negotiations suggested 
a shared understanding.  
While Hand did seem to exhibit a zeal for the objective theory of contract, some 
of that apparent zeal is likely attributable to his original writing style and his desire 
to clarify the law, which surely led to his memorable dicta.  In any event, recognizing 
that he had a zeal for the objective theory should not lead one to believe he shared 
all of the characteristics commonly associated with formalism and classical contract 
 
313  Oshinsky v. Lorraine Mfg. Co., 187 F. 120, 121 (2d Cir. 1911). 
314  Id. 
315  E. Geril & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 48 F.2d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1931). 
316  Id. 
317  Town of Readsboro v. Hoosac Tunnerl & W.R. Co., 6 F.2d 733, 734 (2d Cir. 1925). 
318  Id. 
319  Moon Motor Car Co., of N.Y. v. Moon Motor Car Co., 29 F.2d 3, 4 (2d Cir. 1928) (citing Wood 
v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917)). 
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law.  His rejection of a constitutional right to freedom of contract, his belief that 
language cannot have a plain meaning outside of its context, his willingness to 
admit a broad array of contextual evidence to interpret contract language, and his 
willingness to infer a promise when the evidence supported such an inference, 
shows that his approach to contract interpretation was more modern than one 
would expect from a so-called great commercial formalist lawyer with a crusader’s 
zeal for the objective theory of contract. 
 
